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1 
WHEN DUE PROCESS CONCERNS BECOME 
DANGEROUS: THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S 
1267 REGIME AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Jared Genser* 
Kate Barth** 
Abstract: The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 
in 1999 in response to rising apprehension of a surge of terrorist activity 
within Afghan territory. Notably, the Sanctions Committee charged with 
enforcing the Resolution provisions did not impose asset freezes, arms 
prohibitions, or travel bans on entire nations suspected of supporting the 
Taliban. The 1267 regime instead subjected individuals and entities to 
these sanctions. Based on information provided by U.N. member states, 
such targets found themselves on the Security Council’s terrorist “black-
list,” known as the Consolidated List. The targets were neither warned of 
this listing nor afforded a method by which they could effectively appeal 
their inclusion. This Article discusses the due process concerns inherent 
to the 1267 regime, which have been increasingly emphasized at both the 
regional and national court levels, leading to invalidation of some regula-
tions implementing the regime. It then evaluates alternative solutions to 
the procedural status quo against a proposed set of criteria, ultimately ad-
vocating for an independent tribunal capable of hearing complaints from 
targets and issuing binding delisting decisions. 
Introduction 
 In 1999, the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C. or Security 
Council) adopted Resolution 12671 under its Chapter VII authority,2 in 
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1 S.C. Res. 1267, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
2 When read together, Article 25 of the UN charter (requiring all member states “to 
accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council”) and Article 103 of the Charter 
(demanding all states defer to their Charter responsibilities over other international obli-
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response to concerns over the use of Afghan territory “for the shelter-
ing and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts.” This Reso-
lution, which would be strengthened and reaffirmed by subsequent 
Resolutions 1333, 1363, 1373, 1390, 1452, 1455, 1526, 1566, 1617, 1624, 
1699, 1730, 1735, 1822, and 19043 imposed sweeping sanctions against 
the Taliban in the form of travel and arms bans and asset freezes.4 Un-
like previous U.N.S.C. sanctions that had blanketed entire nations, 
however, these sanctions targeted only those resources “owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the Taliban . . . as designated by the 
[Sanctions] Committee [set up by the resolution] . . . .”5 Based on in-
formation provided by U.N. member states, this Sanctions Committee 
would be responsible for keeping an updated list (Consolidated List) of 
targeted individuals and entities. In 2001, the Committee added the 
name of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi Arabian businessman, who soon 
after found his assets summarily frozen.6 
 Kadi was not alone in finding himself the individual target of the 
Security Council’s terrorist “blacklist.”7 To date, the list has contained 
the names of over five hundred individuals and entities (targets).8 The 
Committee has rarely informed the targets placed on the Consolidated 
List of the facts underlying their placement on the list, or even the very 
                                                                                                                      
gations) ensure that resolutions made pursuant to the U.N.S.C.’s powers under Chapter 
VII are binding on all member states of the U.N. See infra Part I. 
3 See generally S.C. Res. 1904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009); S.C. Res. 1822, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 ( June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 
2006); S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006); S.C. Res. 1699, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1699 (Aug. 8, 2006); S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); S.C. 
Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 ( July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 
(Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 ( Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1455 ( Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002); 
S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 ( Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 ( July 30, 2001); S.C. 
Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). These resolutions pertain both to the 
targeted sanction 1267 regime and to the subsequently enacted 1373 regime, which ex-
tended asset freezes and travel bans to members of any terrorist group. 
4 See S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 3, ¶ 1. The 1267 sanctions were later broadened to in-
clude “funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities 
associated with him as designated by the Committee, including those in the Al-Qaida or-
ganization . . . .” S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 3, ¶ 8. 
5 S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, ¶ 4. 
6 See Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council (Kadi I ), ¶¶ 22–23, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, 2005 ECJ 
EUR-Lex LEXIS 673 (Sept. 21, 2005). 
7 See United Nations, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/information.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) 
(noting that the list holds more than 500 names). 
8 See id. 
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fact of their inclusion.9 Moreover, the Security Council has provided no 
mechanism for targets to challenge their inclusion either before or af-
ter the listing.10 Those targets dissatisfied with the freeze on their assets 
or the restriction of their movement can only hope that their state of 
residence or citizenship will negotiate with whatever country had rec-
ommended their listing (designating state) to reach a mutual agree-
ment to recommend the delisting of the individual. Nevertheless, 
should any member of the Sanctions Committee (consisting of repre-
sentatives of all countries on the Security Council) choose to block the 
delisting, the target will remain indefinitely listed.11 
 Unlike many targets, however, Kadi sought judicial redress for what 
he saw as an unfair listing. By 2008, his case had risen to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), which overruled the prior decision by the Court 
of First Instance to uphold the European Union’s regulation giving ef-
fect to Resolution 1267.12 Instead, citing due process violations contrary 
to the “constitutional guarantee stemming from the [European Com-
munity] Treaty as an autonomous legal system,” the ECJ annulled the EU 
regulation as it concerned Kadi.13 The judgment tore a hole in member 
states’ implementation of the U.N.S.C.’s 1267 anti-terrorist regime and 
sparked a firestorm of debate as to the appropriate circumstances under 
which regional courts may interfere with the implementation of a bind-
ing Security Council resolution on human rights grounds.14 
 Ironically, it was the international community’s concerns about the 
human rights implications of general sanctions that led the Security 
Council to implement targeted sanctions.15 The general sanctions 
placed on Iraq in the early 1990s had a devastating humanitarian effect 
on the people of Iraq.16 As a result, the Security Council increasingly 
turned to targeted sanctions as a means of applying pressure on those 
                                                                                                                      
9 Cf. Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert, Watson Inst. Targeted Sanctions Pro-
ject, Brown Univ., Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Pro-
cedures 28 (2006), available at http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_ 
Sanctions.pdf [hereinafter Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions](discussing the lack 
of transparency that exists concerning sources of information about an individual’s listing). 
10 Id. at 3–7. 
11 Id. at 37. 
12 Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council (Kadi II ), ¶¶ 1–2, 2008 E.C.R. I-
6351, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954 (Sept. 3, 2008). 
13 Id. ¶ 316. 
14 Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
15 See Save the Children, Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Op-
tions for the Future, ch. 10 (2002) [hereinafter Save the Children]. 
16 See id. ch. 2 (detailing the humanitarian toll exacted on Iraqis by the general sanc-
tions). 
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responsible for threatening international peace and security while mi-
nimizing collateral impact.17 The Security Council’s failure to provide 
any due process protections for targets of these new sanctions, however, 
has raised a different set of criticisms about its approach. 
 Whereas the ramifications of sanctions aimed at a particular state 
fell almost entirely on the residents of that state, the 1267 regime re-
quires all member states of the United Nations (U.N.) to implement 
regulations potentially depriving their own citizens of property rights, 
restricting their movement, and barring judicial review.18 For those 
states with strong domestic traditions and laws protecting these rights, 
such a mandate is extremely troubling. Thus, several international, re-
gional, and domestic tribunals, such as the European Court of Justice, 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Swiss Fed-
eral Court, the British House of Lords, the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court, and the Federal Court of Canada, have challenged the national 
regulations giving effect to certain Security Council resolutions.19 Al-
though many of these tribunals have grudgingly accepted the primacy 
of the resolutions under the U.N Charter, judicial discontent has been 
mounting. The ECJ’s recent decision in Kadi v. Council (Kadi II ) marks 
the first time a regional court has chosen to annul a domestic regulation 
implementing a binding Security Council resolution.20 Emboldened by 
Kadi II, national courts have likewise begun to invalidate the domestic 
regulations that implemented Resolution 1267 obligations in member 
states.21 
 In the face of this mounting criticism, the Security Council has 
taken some incremental steps to ameliorate member states’ due process 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. 
18 See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2, 4. 
19 See generally Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2009] F.C. 580 (Can.); A v. 
HM Treasury, [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 378 (U.K.); R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State 
for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); Kadi I, 
2005 E.C.R. II-3659, 2005 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 673; Kadi II, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 ECJ 
EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954; Case C-117/06, Möllendorf, 2007 E.C.R. I-8361, 1 C.M.L.R. 11 
(2008); Case C-355/04, Segi v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2015 
(Feb. 27, 2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008); Johannes Reich, Due Process and Sanctions 
Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to U.N. Resolution 1267 (1999), 33 Yale J. Int’l L. 505, 
507 n.25 (2008)(discussing Nada v. State Secretariat for Econ. Affairs, Bundesgericht 
[BGer] [Federal Court] Nov. 14, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundes-
gerichts [BGE] II 450 (Switz.)). 
20 See Kadi II, ¶ 372, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954. 
21 See Abdelrazik, F.C. 580 ¶¶ 162–65; HM Treasury, 2 W.L.R. at 408–10. 
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concerns. The first substantive concession came with the Security 
Council’s adoption of Resolution 1730.22 This Resolution established a 
central office called the focal point, which is entrusted with the tasks of 
handling delisting requests from targets by passing along such requests 
to the concerned states (the designating state and the state of the peti-
tioner’s residence and citizenship) and informing the petitioner of the 
ultimate decision made by the Sanctions Committee.23 Once the focal 
point issues a request, the target’s participation in its own delisting is 
over. Should any government recommend a target’s delisting, the re-
quest is put on the Sanction Committee’s agenda. The Sanctions 
Committee is also informed if any government opposes delisting. Un-
fortunately, if after one month no member of the Sanctions Committee 
recommends delisting, the request is considered rejected. Although 
Resolution 1730 frees targets from reliance on a state’s initial espousal 
of a claim,24 it does not give targets an opportunity to hear the evidence 
against them or to present their own case to the Sanctions Commit-
tee.25 Additionally, Resolution 1730 does not require a state to explain 
why it chose to block an individual’s delisting request.26 
 Other resolutions have requested that the Sanctions Committee 
make “information it considers relevant . . . publicly available”27 or that 
it allow individual member states to administer humanitarian exemp-
tions to the asset freeze.28 Resolutions have also asked member states to 
include better indentifying information when proposing a name for 
the list and to inform individuals of their listing and of the Committee’s 
guidelines and humanitarian exemptions.29 In 2008, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1822, which urged member states to re-
view delisting petitions in a timely manner and to update the Commit-
tee on any new developments.30 The Resolution directed the Sanctions 
Committee to conduct periodic reviews of targets to ensure the listing 
remained appropriate and “[encouraged] the Committee to continue 
                                                                                                                      
22 See generally S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 3 (establishing a central office for handling 
delisting requests). 
23 Id. 
24 See Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 34–37 (noting that 
the biggest problem with delisting may have been the number of requests that never made 
it to the Sanctions Committee due to a state’s refusal to espouse a target’s claim). 
25 S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 3, app. ¶¶ 5–8. 
26 Id. app. ¶¶ 5–6. 
27 S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 3, ¶ 5. 
28 See S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
29 See S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 3, ¶¶ 4–5; S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 3, ¶¶ 17–18. 
30 S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 3, ¶ 20. 
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to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals . . . 
on the Consolidated List and for removing them . . . .”31 
 Most recently, on December 17, 2009, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1904 which created “an Office of the Ombudsperson, to be 
established for an initial period of 18 months . . . .”32 This ombudsper-
son, performing in “an independent and impartial manner,”33 assists 
targeted individuals by conveying their delisting requests to the Sanc-
tions Committee, keeping them informed of general procedure and 
decisions made relevant to their case, and ensuring that the Commit-
tee’s consideration period is not unduly prolonged.34 In addition, the 
ombudsperson aids the Sanctions Committee by soliciting additional 
information from and facilitating a dialogue with the petitioner; coor-
dinating inquiries between the interested States, the Committee, and 
the information-gathering Monitoring Team; and drafting a Compre-
hensive Report pursuant to the delisting request, and presenting it in 
person to the Committee.35 In effect, Resolution 1904 creates in the 
ombudsperson a watchdog over the interests of delisting petitioners, 
albeit one without the ability to ensure that Sanctions Committee takes 
its observations seriously or ultimately delists the petitioner.36 
 Despite these positive developments, the fundamental criticism of 
the 1267 regime has remained unchanged—that targets have no effec-
tive remedy to challenge their inclusion on the Consolidated List.37 Al-
though judges sitting in domestic and regional courts have been sym-
pathetic to these complaints, they have not suggested that protection is 
solely the province of domestic or regional courts. Rather, these courts 
have implied that, should the Security Council provide a reasonable 
means for administrative review of a listing, they would consider the 
due process issue remedied.38 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. ¶ 28. 
32 S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 3, ¶ 20. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. annex II. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
37 Bardo Fassbender, United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Targeted Sanc-
tions and Due Process 5 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_ 
from_lc/Fassbender_study.pdf. Although this Article is primarily concerned with the due 
process violations stemming from the 1267 regime, similar criticisms have been made of 
Security Council resolutions authorizing the detention of alleged terrorists. See, e.g., R (Al-
Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332, 332–33 (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.). 
38 See Kadi II, ¶ 319, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954 (“[S]o long as 
under that system of sanctions the individuals or entities concerned have an acceptable 
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 Now that judicial discontent has reached the level of invalidating 
national and regional implementation of a binding Security Council 
resolution, the failure to address these due process concerns has cre-
ated a security crisis. As a result, the present represents a critical mo-
ment to reform the 1267 regime. There is no shortage of reform sug-
gestions. Legal commentators over the past decade have argued for 
various centralized and decentralized schemes that could solve the due 
process problem. This Article evaluates the various factors (due proc-
ess, a strong counter-terrorist regime, and U.N.S.C. authority) that 
must be taken into account in selecting an appropriate review mecha-
nism. It then proposes that the Security Council create an independent 
tribunal with the power to hear a target’s case and issue binding delist-
ing decisions. 
 Part I of this Article explains the legally binding and preeminent 
nature of the 1267 regime as a Chapter VII resolution of the Security 
Council and describes the rising tide of discontent that has been ema-
nating from regional and national courts. Part II discusses the conse-
quences of these cases, both in terms of security concerns and threats 
to the primacy of the Security Council. This section then explains the 
due process problems inherent to the current procedure before analyz-
ing a range of suggestions from various legal commentators. Part III 
identifies criteria for assessing the viability of alternative solutions. 
These proposed criteria include such issues as independence of a deci-
sion-maker, accessibility to the target, ability to provide an effective re-
medy, speed, concern over sharing sensitive information, infringement 
on Security Council authority, and the overall political efficacy of the 
proposed solution. The aim, of course, is not simply to resolve the due 
process problem, but to do so in a manner that does not negatively af-
fect security concerns, either by weakening the 1267 regime or by 
threatening the supremacy of the U.N.S.C. The Article concludes with 
the argument that an independent tribunal with the ability to hear in-
dividual complaints and issue binding decisions is the mechanism that 
best balances these concerns. 
                                                                                                                      
opportunity to be heard through a mechanism of administrative review forming part of 
the United Nations legal system, the Court must not intervene in any way whatsoever.”). 
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I. Background 
A. The Binding and Preeminent Nature of Certain Chapter VII Resolutions 
 As the touchstone for understanding the role of U.N. institu-
tions,39 the U.N. Charter serves as the starting point for an analysis of 
the impact of Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council. Article 
24 states that members of the U.N. “confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security . . . .”40 To that end, Article 25 further explains that “[t]he 
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”41 
This provision has been interpreted to mean that “decisions” taken un-
der Chapter VII, which are not recommendations, are considered le-
gally binding on all member states.42 
 The U.N. Charter also provides clear textual guidance that when 
the Security Council acts in relation to matters of international peace 
and security, its decisions supersede all other international obligations 
of member states. Specifically, Article 103 provides: “In the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the . . . Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under the . . . Charter shall pre-
vail.”43 In this way, Article 103 functions as a de facto international su-
premacy clause mandating that a state’s U.N. obligations override its 
other international commitments. Furthermore, Article 103 is under-
stood to mean that in determining a State’s conflicting international 
obligations, it is not only the Charter but also any obligation under the 
Charter that prevails.44 Article 103 is likewise memorialized in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which under Article 30 states: 
“Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights 
and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the 
same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the follow-
                                                                                                                      
39 See Comm’n to Study the Org. of Peace, The United Nations: The Next Twen-
ty-Five Years 2 (1970). 
40 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
41 Id. art. 25. 
42 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 457 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d 
ed. 2002). There are also decisions of the Security Council taken under other chapters of 
the U.N. Charter which are binding, but the focus of this Article is exclusively on Chapter 
VII sanctions-related resolutions. 
43 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
44 The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 42, at 1292. 
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ing. . . .”45 Thus, Article 30 reinforces the proposition that each state’s 
obligations under the U.N. Charter supersede its commitments under 
other international treaties, protocols, and mechanisms. 
 Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to 
make recommendations or decisions to address that which the Council 
determines to be a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act 
of aggression.46 Not all Chapter VII resolutions are per se legally bind-
ing, however.47 There is a three-pronged test to determine whether a 
Chapter VII Resolution is binding: (1) if there is a determination under 
Article 29 of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression; (2) if there is explicit evidence of action under 
Chapter VII; and (3) if there is evidence that the Council has made a 
decision within the meaning of Article 25, which provides that “the 
Members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”48 
 Resolution 1267 satisfies these three criteria. First, there has been a 
“determination” that the failure of the Taliban to stop providing “sanc-
tuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations,” 
as required by paragraph 13 of Resolution 1214, constitutes a “threat to 
international peace and security.”49 Second, the Resolution explicitly 
states the Security Council is “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations.”50 Third, in the operative section of the Resolu-
tion, the Security Council unequivocally decided that “all States shall 
. . . (a) [d]eny permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in 
their territory . . . [if from the] Taliban . . . [and] (b) [f]reeze funds 
and other financial resources [from] . . . the Taliban, as designated by 
the [Sanctions] Committee . . . .”51 Therefore, it is indisputable that the 
Chapter VII resolution is binding on all member states of the U.N. 
 So why is the binding nature of Resolution 1267 a problem? In 
short, consistent with the requirements of Articles 25 and 103, all states 
must implement the Resolution 1267 sanction regime even if the mini-
                                                                                                                      
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, para. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
46 U.N. Charter, arts. 39–51. 
47 See Sir Michael Wood, Senior Fellow, Lauterpacht Ctr. for Int’l Law, Univ. of Cam-
bridge, First Lecture at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law: The Legal Frame-
work of the Security Council, ¶ 31 (Nov. 7, 2006) available at http://www.lcil.cam. 
ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006_hersch_lecture_1.pdf. 
48 Id. ¶¶ 38–39. 
49 See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, ¶ 4. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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mal due process protections for targets are in flagrant violation of a 
state’s other binding international or regional legal obligations, such as 
those enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, American Con-
vention on Human Rights, or European Convention on Human 
Rights.52 
B. Increasing Judicial Discontent 
 Regional and domestic courts have become increasingly more sym-
pathetic to claims arising from a target’s placement on the Consolidated 
List over the past several years. European courts have tended to serve as 
the fora for such cases given Europe’s strong domestic and regional laws 
protecting human rights.53 Since 2005, courts have increasingly chal-
lenged the idea that Security Council resolutions are unbounded by any 
law, while simultaneously upholding resolutions’ primacy over interna-
tional law and the domestically-implemented regulation in question.54 
By the end of 2008, however, the ECJ was bold enough to challenge the 
enforcement of a binding Security Council resolution by annulling the 
contested European regulation. Subsequent 2009 and 2010 decisions in 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic upheld the primacy of targeted in-
dividuals’ rights over the domestic regulations and actions intended to 
                                                                                                                      
52 See generally U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-21 (1969), 1144 
U.N.T.S. 143; European Convention on Human Rights, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
53 See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order Af-
ter Kadi, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (noting that the EU sees itself as a “virtuous inter-
national actor” with an ambition “to carve out a distinctive international role for itself as a 
‘normative power’ committed to effective multilateralism under international law”). 
54 See generally R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 
332 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); Kadi v. Council (Kadi II), 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954; Case C-117/06, Möllendorf, 2007 E.C.R. I-8361, 1 C.M.L.R. 11 
(2008); Case C-355/04, Segi v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2015 
(Feb. 27, 2007); Reich, supra note 19 (discussing Nada, 133 BGE II 450). Article 103 of the 
U.N. Charter requires that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.” U.N. Charter art. 103. Article 25 reads: “The Members of the United Nations 
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 25. Taken together, these articles mandate that 
member state obligations to carry out U.N.S.C. resolutions trump other international law 
obligations. 
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carry out member states’ binding obligations under Security Council 
resolutions.55 
 As a starting point for this analysis, it is important to understand 
the legal limits of Security Council action. The Security Council, like any 
organ of the U.N., is bound by law—and specifically the framework of 
powers and functions articulated for it in the U.N. Charter.56 Even 
though acts of the Security Council are not justiciable, it must neverthe-
less abide by these rules.57 Additionally, the Security Council cannot 
contravene preemptory norms of international law (jus cogens).58 These 
fundamental principles circumscribing the power of the Security Coun-
cil have also been recognized by the tribunals that have examined the 
validity of the 1267 regime. 
1. Security Council Bound by Jus Cogens 
 The 2005 case, Kadi I, was the first to significantly challenge the 
1267 regime.59 At first glance, the ruling of the Court of First Instance 
                                                                                                                      
55 Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2009] F.C. 580 ¶¶ 162–65 (Can.); A v. HM 
Treasury, [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 378, 408–10 (U.K.). It is also worth noting that 
there have been more than thirty court cases challenging the 1267 regime since its inception, 
and these cases are not limited to Europe and North America, but also include challenges in 
Turkey and Pakistan. See Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert, Watson Inst. Targeted 
Sanctions Project, Brown Univ., Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions: An 
Update of the "Watson Report" 47–48 (2009), available at http://www.watsoninstitute. 
org/pub/2009_10_targeted_sanctions.pdf [hereinafter Biersteker & Eckert, Watson Re-
port Update]. 
56 See, e.g., Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 64 (May 28). The opinion states: 
The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of 
the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limita-
tions on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ 
has freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms 
of the constitution. 
Id. 
57 See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; see, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Con-
go (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 53 (Feb. 3) (observing that “[w]hether or 
not States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, they are required to fulfill their obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law”). 
58 See Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Char-
ter, 3 Santa Clara J. Int’l. L. 72, 96–97 (2005); Wood, supra note 47, ¶ 6. 
59 See generally Kadi I, 2005 E.C.R. II-3659, 2005 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 673. Jus cogens is a 
principle of international law so fundamental that no nation or institution may ignore or 
attempt to contractually circumvent it through treaties. See The Fundamental Rules of 
the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Ergo Omnes 29 (Chris-
tian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006). Classic examples of jus cogens norms 
include the prohibition of genocide and participation in the slave trade. See id. at 99. 
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(CFI) of the ECJ appears deferential to the authority of the Security 
Council.60 The court held that U.N. member states’ obligation to re-
spect Security Council resolutions under customary law and under Ar-
ticle 103 of the U.N. Charter, “clearly prevail[s] over every other obliga-
tion of domestic law or of international treaty law . . . .”61 Thus, the 
court did not even have “the jurisdiction to review indirectly the law-
fulness” of a U.N.S.C. decision.62 
 After concluding that it had no jurisdiction to review a Security 
Council resolution, however, the court further declared: 
None the less [sic], the Court is empowered to check, indi-
rectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council 
in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of 
higher rules of public international law binding on all sub-
jects of international law, including the bodies of the United 
Nations, and from which no derogation is possible.63 
Yet, despite reaffirming this well-understood limit on Security Council 
action, the court ultimately found that, in the instant case, the Security 
Council Resolutions had not actually breached jus cogens.64 
 This holding, although remaining deferential to the Resolutions at 
hand, broke with earlier European cases that dealt with a Security 
Council resolution’s effect on an individual. For example, in Bosphorus 
Hava Yollari Turizm v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, 
Irish authorities impounded a Yugoslavian aircraft.65 The aircraft had 
been leased to a Turkish company pursuant to an EC regulation that 
formed part of the U.N. sanctions regime against the Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia.66 In this case, the ECJ held that, when viewed in light of 
the aims intended by the U.N. resolution, the impounding of the air-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Kadi I, ¶ 181, 2005 E.C.R. II-3659, 2005 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 673. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. ¶ 221. 
63 Id. ¶ 226. 
64 Id. ¶ 275. The court found that, with regard to the freezing of Kadi’s funds, jus co-
gens only prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property, and Kadi had not been arbitrarily 
nor permanently deprived of his assets. See id. ¶¶ 243–51. The alleged breach of the right 
to be heard did not violate jus cogens as the Sanctions Committee offered a mechanism for 
the re-examination of individual cases, albeit only through national espousal. Id. ¶ 261–62. 
Finally, as regarding the breach of the right to effective judicial review, the court found 
that the right of access to courts is not absolute and thus not a right guaranteed by jus 
cogens. Id. ¶¶ 287, 291. 
65 See Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Minister for Transp., Energy & 
Commc’ns, ¶ 2, 1996 E.C.R. I-3953 ( Judgment). 
66 Id. ¶ 1 (Opinion of Advocate General). 
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craft could not “be regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate.”67 
Nowhere did the ECJ imply that it could invalidate regulations imple-
menting a Security Council resolution. Furthermore, in the cases of 
Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France,68 which revolved around a 
wrongful death and detainment attributable to U.N. peacekeeping 
forces in Kosovo, the European Court of Human Rights found that “the 
[European] Convention[on Human Rights] cannot be interpreted in a 
manner which would subject the acts and omissions of contracting par-
ties, which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in 
the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court.”69 
 The reasoning of the CFI in Kadi proved influential. In 2007, the 
Swiss Federal Court issued a similar decision on a blacklisting case. 
Youseff Mustafa Nada was an Egyptian-born Italian national who had 
been put on the Consolidated List due to his involvement with Al 
Taqwa Management SA, a widespread financial network suspected of 
supporting terrorist activities.70 At the time of his listing, Nada was liv-
ing in Campione d’Italia, “a small Italian enclave roughly half a square 
mile in size fully surrounded by Swiss territory.”71 As a result of his 
placement on the Consolidated List, Nada was restricted from leaving 
Campione d’Italia and his assets were frozen.72 After a three-year inves-
tigation into his alleged terrorist connections terminated, Nada filed a 
petition with the Swiss domestic agency responsible for the enforce-
ment of sanctions.73 The agency dismissed the petition, and the case 
eventually ended up in the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.74 
 Ultimately, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court also dismissed Nada’s 
petition, pointing to its member state obligation to enforce the resolu-
tions of the Security Council.75 Just like the CFI in Kadi, however, the 
court held that it could annul implementing regulations when and if 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. ¶ 26 ( Judgment). 
68 Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. SE10 (2007). Behrami concerned the death and injury of two children in Kosovo who 
unknowingly played with undetonated cluster bomb units under the control of Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) units. See id. ¶¶ 5–7. Saramati dealt with the prolonged detention of an Al-
banian man under suspicion for attempted murder and illegal possession of a weapon in 
Kosovo by the KFOR. See id. ¶¶ 8–17. 
69 Id. ¶ 149 . 
70 See Reich, supra note 19, at 507–08. 
71 Id. at 507. 
72 Id. at 508. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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the Security Council resolution clashed with jus cogens norms.76 Unfor-
tunately for Nada, the court did not find that his frozen assets and con-
tainment to a half-square mile qualified as a violation of jus cogens.77 
 The CFI’s decision in Kadi and a Swiss Federal Supreme Court de-
cision marked the first instances in which domestic and regional courts 
affirmed the heretofore theoretical limitations on the Security Coun-
cil’s powers in the context of the 1267 regime.78 Moreover, not only did 
these courts hold that jus cogens bound the U.N.S.C., but they also reaf-
firmed that a regional or domestic courts had the jurisdictional compe-
tence to determine whether this boundary had been breached. Al-
though these courts ultimately found that the Resolutions in question 
did not breach jus cogens and upheld the implementing regulations, 
their decisions put the Security Council on notice that the 1267 regime 
was under scrutiny. 
2. Reaffirming the Importance of Fundamental Rights 
 After the CFI and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions, a 
number of cases followed which, although not purporting to restrict 
the U.N.S.C.’s resolution-making authority, still very much emphasized 
the importance of honoring due process rights. The ECJ heard another 
listing case, albeit one stemming not from the 1267 Resolution regime, 
but rather from the obligations imposed on states by Resolution 1373.79 
Resolution 1373 was another anti-terrorism measure which called upon 
states to freeze the funds of any terrorist or terrorist sympathizer.80 
Unlike Resolution 1267 and its progeny, Resolution 1373 allowed indi-
vidual member states to list and delist their own nationals without a 
U.N. entity maintaining a Consolidated List. 
 In response to this Resolution, the European Union adopted a 
Common Position which listed Segi, a Spanish group purportedly asso-
ciated with Basque terrorists, as an entity whose assets were to be fro-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Reich, supra note 19, at 508. 
77 See id. 
78See Búrca, supra note 53, at 23, Reich, supra note 19, at 508 (discussing Nada, 133 
BGE II 450). 
79 See Segi v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2015 (Feb. 27, 
2007). 
80 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 3, ¶ 1. Resolution 1373 targeted all “persons who 
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission 
of terrorist acts,” whereas the 1267 regime targeted only the Taliban and terrorists con-
nected to Al-Qaida. See id.; S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, ¶ 4(b). 
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zen.81 When Segi brought its complaint over the listing to the ECJ, the 
court, in Segi v. Council, noted that member states of the European Un-
ion must enable “natural and legal persons to challenge before the 
courts the lawfulness of any decision or other national measure relating 
to the drawing up of an act of the European Union or to its application 
to them and to seek compensation for any loss suffered.”82 Neverthe-
less, after stating that judicial protection must be available to those af-
fected by acts of the European Union (here, the adoption of a Com-
mon Position implementing Resolution 1373), the court proceeded to 
hold that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the complaint at hand 
because it could not “create a legal remedy not provided for by the ap-
plicable texts.”83 Thus, while reaffirming that the right to court access is 
a fundamental right, the court simultaneously dodged the question of 
whether a regulation that did not grant a remedy for a potential breach 
of rights is invalid.84 
 Later that same year, the ECJ also heard the Möllendorf case, in 
which a 1267 listing imposed some unforeseen consequences on a third 
party.85 This case concerned a contract of sale for land conducted be-
tween two parties in which the money had already been paid to the 
sellers when the buyer was blacklisted.86 Under German law, ownership 
had not yet transferred because the transaction had not been regis-
tered in the Land Registry.87 Since the asset freeze on the buyer prohib-
ited registration, the issue arose as to whether the sales transaction had 
to be reversed, as was usual procedure under German law.88 The sellers, 
however, argued that being forced to repay the sales price would dis-
proportionately limit their right to property.89 
 The ECJ ultimately concluded that it was for the German authori-
ties to determine whether a “disproportionate infringement of the 
right to property” had occurred, as the sellers contended, and, if it had, 
“to apply the national legislation in question, so far as it is possible, in 
such a way that the requirements flowing from Community law are not 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Segi, ¶¶ 1–3, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2015. The Spanish 
High Court had also declared Segi’s activities illegal and ordered incarceration for several 
of Segi’s leaders. See id. ¶ 9. 
82 Id. ¶ 56. 
83 Id. ¶¶ 60, 61. 
84 See id. ¶ 60. 
85 See generally Case C-117/06, Möllendorf, 2007 E.C.R. I-8361, 1 C.M.L.R. 11 (2008). 
86 See id. ¶¶ 22–29. 
87 See id. ¶ 52. 
88 See id. ¶ 59, 62. 
89 See id. ¶¶ 22–40. 
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infringed.”90 Much like its analysis in Segi, the court did not put the le-
gality of the 1267 sanction regime at stake but rather concentrated on 
the scope of the implementing measures. Once again, the court side-
stepped examining the Resolution itself while still managing to high-
light the importance of protecting an individual’s rights. 
 Not all courts were as protective of fundamental rights in the face 
of a binding Security Council resolution, given the U.N. Charter's Ar-
ticle 103 supremacy clause. In R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 
for example, the British House of Lords found that Resolution 1546, 
permitting the Multi-National Force operating in Iraq to detain indi-
viduals for reasons of security, prevailed over the United Kingdom’s ob-
ligations to honor due process rights guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.91 The House of Lords qualified the su-
premacy of Resolution 1546, however, holding that Security Council-
provided authority must be exercised in such a way that a detainee’s 
rights are not infringed to a greater degree than necessary in such a de-
tention.92 Baroness Hale of Richmond concluded that, although a Secu-
rity Council resolution might overrule a British commitment to the due 
process rights guaranteed in the European Convention, “[t]he right was 
qualified, but not displaced.”93 
 Taken together, these cases reaffirm that binding Security Council 
resolutions do not permanently overrule member states’ commitments 
to human rights. On the contrary, they must be interpreted only to 
qualify the right to the smallest extent possible. 
3. Holding States Responsible 
 Beyond the outlying jus cogens limitation on Security Council ac-
tion and reaffirmation of state obligations to due process rights, courts 
have recently begun to hold states liable for their actions taken in con-
formity with Security Council resolutions. In 2008, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), established by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR),94 heard a blacklisting complaint for viola-
tions of the treaty from two Belgian citizens, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. ¶ 79. 
91 See R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332, 354–
355 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
92 See id. at 355. 
93 See id. at 376. 
94 ICCPR, supra note 52, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
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Vinck.95 The two had been placed on the Consolidated List based on 
their leadership positions in the Fondation Secours International, purport-
edly the European branch of an American association which had been 
on the sanctions list for several years.96 When Belgium proposed their 
names to the Sanctions Committee, Sayadi and Vinck had not been 
convicted of any terrorist activity. Moreover, during the period of 
criminal investigation against Sayadi and Vinck, Belgium refused their 
petition to take their delisting request to the Sanctions Committee until 
a domestic court finally ordered it do so.97 
 The HRC determined that although it could not consider the al-
leged violation of other instruments of the U.N. Charter, it was 
competent to consider the compatibility with the Covenant of 
the national measures taken to implement a resolution of the 
United Nations Security Council. It [was] the duty of the 
Committee, as guarantor of rights protected by the Covenant, 
to consider to what extent the obligations imposed on the 
State party by the Security Council resolutions may justify the 
infringement . . . .98 
Thus, granting itself the power to review if a state’s action was in con-
formity with the ICCPR even when acting under binding Security 
Council resolutions, the Committee held that Belgium was liable for 
the initial inappropriate listing of Sayadi and Vinck.99 
 In spite of Belgium’s argument that it was required to respect 
Resolution 1267 and report the names of its suspected terrorist sup-
porters under Article 103, the Committee found that the listing was 
                                                                                                                      
95 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, ¶¶ 2.3–
3.1., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008). Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck claimed 
violations of Articles 2, 4, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 26, and 27 of the Covenant. Id. ¶ 3.1. 
96 See id. ¶ 2.2. 
97 See id. ¶ 2.5. A domestic court also dismissed the case against Sayadi and Vinck after 
three years of a criminal investigation. See id. ¶ 2.6. 
98 Id. ¶ 10.6. 
99 See id. ¶ 3.4. The Committee stated: 
Respect for the presumption of innocence, the right to an effective remedy, 
and the right to a procedure with all due structural and functional guarantees 
have been violated. The presumption of innocence had been flouted by the 
Belgian State’s proposal to place the authors’ names on the Sanctions Com-
mittee list without “relevant information” in breach of article 14, paragraph 2 
of the Covenant. 
Id. 
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premature and therefore illegal.100 Consequently, Belgium was respon-
sible to do everything in its power to remove the petitioners from the 
Consolidated List and to give them some form of compensation.101 Fur-
thermore, Belgium was “also obliged to ensure that similar violations 
do not occur in the future.”102 
 In effect, this decision amounted to a finding that a national regu-
lation’s foundation in a Chapter VII U.N.S.C. resolution does not en-
tirely shield the state from its other international legal obligations. In-
deed, Belgium was held to account for having too eagerly complied 
with the 1267 regime. Nevertheless, the Committee claimed their find-
ings were not an unabashed attack on the Security Council’s authority, 
although the several Committee dissenters disagreed.103 The HRC ex-
plicitly stated that, despite the chilling effect that imposing liability for a 
premature listing might have on states’ compliance with Resolution 
1267’s demand for member states to be active in listing suspected Al-
Qaida supporters, “there is nothing in this case that involves interpret-
ing a provision of the Covenant as impairing the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”104 
 As rebellious as holding a member state liable for an action taken 
in conformity with a U.N.S.C. resolution might seem, this decision was 
probably overshadowed by that of the ECJ, when it revisited the Kadi 
case in 2008 in Kadi v. Council (Kadi II ). The court’s first break from 
the CFI’s decision came with the holding that “obligations imposed by 
an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the 
constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle 
that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights . . . .”105 While 
still noting the primacy of a Security Council resolution pursuant to 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. ¶ 8.1 (noting Belgium’s argument that “under Article 103 of the Charter, 
Charter obligations prevail over any others, a State Member of the United Nations carry-
ing out its obligations under the Charter cannot incur liability under the Covenant”). 
101 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, ¶ 12, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008). 
102 Id. ¶ 13. 
103 See id. ¶ 10.2. Sir Nigel Rodley, Mr. Ivan Shearer, and Ms. Iulia Antoanella Motoc 
wrote: “[U]nless the Committee believes that the State party’s mere compliance with the 
Security Council listing procedure (in absence of bad faith by the State party or overstep-
ping of the Security Council’s powers) is capable of itself violating the Covenant, it is not 
clear how the authors can still be considered victims . . . .” Id. app. A. (Rodley, dissenting in 
part). Ms. Ruth Wedgwood commented, “[t]he authors are complaining about the actions 
and decisions of the United Nations Security Council, not the acts of Belgium.” Id. app. A 
(Wedgwood, dissenting). 
104 Id. ¶ 10.3. 
105 Kadi II, ¶ 285, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954. 
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member states’ Article 103 obligations, the court denied that a decision 
“that a Community measure intended to give effect to such a resolution 
is contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal order [would 
entail] any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international 
law,” despite the fact that such a decision could place the individual 
member states comprising the European Community (EC) in violation 
of international law.106 Just a few paragraphs later, the court also stated 
that there was no basis in the EC Treaty for granting immunity from 
jurisdiction for a Community regulation solely based on the primacy of 
member states’ obligations at the level of the international law.107 
 Ultimately, the ECJ’s reasoning led it to strongly conclude: 
the review by the Court of the validity of any Community 
measure in light of fundamental rights must be considered to 
be the expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of 
a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement.108 
Interestingly enough, however, the ECJ declared that “so long as under 
that system of sanctions the individuals or entities concerned have an 
acceptable opportunity to be heard through a mechanism of adminis-
trative review forming part of the U.N. legal system, the court must not 
intervene in any way whatsoever.”109 Nevertheless, as such a mechanism 
was not in place, the court annulled the contested regulation as it con-
cerned Kadi and potentially placed the twenty-seven member states of 
European Community in breach of international law.110 
 Two further cases elevating the importance of individual rights 
above a member state’s obligations to implement Security Council reso-
lutions followed closely on the heels of Kadi II. In June 2009, the Cana-
dian Federal Court heard Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, a case 
that revolved around a Canadian citizen’s inability to return to Canada 
based on the travel restrictions imposed on him by virtue of his inclu-
sion on the Consolidated List.111 Abdelrazik, a Sudanese-born natural-
ized Canadian citizen, had been repeatedly detained without charge by 
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. ¶ 288. 
107 Id. ¶ 300. 
108 Id. ¶ 316. 
109 Id. ¶ 319. 
110 See id. ¶ 368–69. 
111 Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2009] F.C. 580, ¶¶ 1–4, 23 (Can.). 
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Sudanese authorities while on a trip to Sudan.112 After each detention, 
Abdelrazik attempted to return to Canada, but each of his attempts 
failed, in part due to resistance by Canadian authorities hesitant to al-
low his return.113 The matter was further complicated by the asset and 
travel ban placed on Abdelrazik following his 2006 inclusion on the 
Consolidated List.114 
 Abdelrazik brought his case to court, contending that the Cana-
dian government violated section 6(1) the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which guarantees Canadian citizens the right to enter 
Canada.115 In response, the Canadian government argued that “it is not 
as a consequence of any of Canada’s actions that Mr. Abdelrazik has 
been prevented from entering Canada; rather it is as a consequence of 
his listing by the 1267 Committee as an associate of Al-Qaida.”116 Ac-
cordingly, the government suggested it could not help Abdelrazik re-
turn without violating its obligations under Security Council resolu-
tions, in particular, under the theretofore most recent resolution in the 
1267 regime, Resolution 1822.117 
 The Canadian Federal Court did not find this argument persua-
sive; rather, the court interpreted Resolution 1822 such that it would 
allow Abdelrazik to return without placing Canada in breach.118 First, 
noting that the travel ban of Resolution 1822 permits states to allow 
entry to listed individuals who are citizens of that state,119 Justice Russel 
Zinn defined the term “territory” as used in the Resolution to exclude 
airspace over the other countries that a returning Abdelrazik would 
have to fly through,120 thus interpreting “the UN travel ban [to present] 
no impediment to Mr. Abdelrazik returning home to Canada.”121 Fur-
thermore, the Justice concluded that the exception to the travel and 
asset ban provided in Resolution 1822 for the “fulfilment of a ‘judicial 
process’” was broad enough to include a measure of execution ordered 
by the court.122 Under this expanded definition, a court order requir-
ing the Canadian government to allow Abdelrazik to return would not 
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114 Id. ¶ 23. 
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117 Abdelrazik, F.C. 580, ¶ 44–49. 
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place the government in breach of the Resolution.123 By defining away 
any potential obstructions under the 1267 regime to Abdelrazik’s re-
turn, Justice Zinn was therefore able to find that “[t]here is no im-
pediment from the UN Resolution to Mr. Abdelrazik being repatriated 
to Canada” and to demand that the government provide Abdelrazik 
with a passport, ticket, and an escort back.124 
 Justice Zinn’s interpretation of Resolution 1822 allowed him to 
safeguard the individual’s rights without explicitly placing his country 
in breach of its international obligations.125 Again, this case exemplifies 
a court’s attempt to emphasize human rights in the face of seemingly-
contradictory international obligations without directly defying the Se-
curity Council regulation.126 Presumably, however, a direct challenge to 
this decision would materialize if the Security Council were to interpret 
the exemptions to Resolution 1822 contrary to the Canadian Federal 
Court. In short, Justice Zinn’s confidence in his own interpretation of 
the Resolution’s terms returned the question of reform back to the Se-
curity Council’s court; if left unaddressed, the 1267 regime’s imple-
mentation could splinter across lines of national interpretation. 
 A v. HM Treasury, a case adjudicated by the new Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom (U.K. Supreme Court), is the most recent case to 
address U.K. laws implementing the 1267 regime.127 In determining 
whether the national regulations placing asset and travel bans on the 
targeted individuals were unlawful, the court explicitly considered both 
the Kadi II and the Abdelrazik holdings128 before concluding that R (Al-
Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence 129 had established precedent “that 
article 103 leaves no room for any exception, and that the [European] 
Convention rights fall into the category of obligations under an inter-
national agreement over which obligations under the [U.N.] Charter 
must prevail.”130 The court refused to let the inquiry end there, how-
ever, and suggested that Al-Jedda “leaves open for consideration how the 
position may be regarded under domestic law.”131 Ultimately, the court 
held that the targeted individual “is entitled to succeed on the point 
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that the regime to which he has been subjected has deprived him of 
access to an effective remedy.”132 The implementing regulations were 
quashed on the grounds they violated the 1946 United Nations Act.133 
This statute provides the executive in the United Kingdom discretion to 
adopt regulations outside of parliamentary scrutiny when it acts to im-
plement certain mandates of the U.N.S.C.,134 but such regulations 
“must be either ‘necessary’ or ‘expedient’ to enable those measures to 
be ‘applied’ effectively.”135 
 Interestingly, in finding that the targeted individuals were imper-
missibly denied judicial access, the majority explicitly considered 
whether the recently enacted Resolution 1904, establishing the om-
budsperson’s office, remedied prior due process concerns.136 After dis-
cussing the continuing problems with transparency, listing, and delist-
ing, the court concluded that “[w]hile these improvements are to be 
welcomed, the fact remains that there was not when the designations 
were made, and still is not, any effective judicial remedy.”137 Unfortu-
nately for those concerned with maintaining the primacy of Security 
Council resolutions, it seems that Resolution 1904’s attempt to allay 
national court concerns over due process has not turned back the ris-
ing tide of judicial discontent. Indeed, it is worth noting that the U.K. 
Supreme Court did not even discuss in depth the fact that quashing the 
domestic regulations could place the state in breach of its Security 
Council obligations.138 Instead, the court seemed more concerned with 
protection of individual rights than its potential violation of interna-
tional law.139 
 Furthermore, the due process deficiencies of the 1267 regime have 
begun to attract the attention of legislators as well as judges. On March 
1, 2010, the Swiss Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a 
proposal over the objection of the Swiss Foreign Minister urging the 
Swiss government to inform the Security Council it intended to refuse 
to apply financial sanctions to any targeted individual who has not been 
given judicial access after three years, was unable to appeal his or her 
listing in front of a judicial body, and has not had any further accusa-
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. at 414. 
133 Id. at 400. 
134 Id. at 386, 400, 414. 
135 United Nations Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 45, § 1 (U.K.). 
136 HM Treasury, 2 W.L.R. at 413–14. 
137 Id. 
138 See generally id. 
139 See id. at 407–15. 
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tions made against him or her.140 Clearly, courts and legislators em-
boldened by Kadi II will require more than the newly-established om-
budsperson’s office to satisfy their due process concerns. 
II. Discussion 
A. Consequences of the Recent Decisions 
 This stream of recent decisions has left both the validity and the 
efficacy of the 1267 regime on rockier ground than at any point since 
its adoption in 1999. For several years, the scope of customary law with 
respect to due process has been broadening to include actions by in-
ternational organizations that affect individuals.141 This trend, as well as 
the fact that the U.N. itself has substantially contributed to the devel-
opment of international human rights law, has led to the expectation 
that the U.N. will observe basic standards of due process.142 The recent 
blacklisting decisions will only contribute to this expectation and will 
perhaps encourage other domestic or regional courts to issue their own 
challenges to the U.N.S.C. The real danger, of course, lies not in the 
fact that other courts might choose to annul resolution-implementing 
regulations based on that state’s higher standards of human rights pro-
tection, but rather that courts will use the Kadi II precedent “to assert 
their local understandings of human rights and their particular consti-
tutional priorities over international norms . . . .”143 A court could dis-
regard a UN resolution not because it falls short of domestic human 
rights guarantees but simply because it contradicts other domestic legal 
principles. 
 Practically speaking, after these recent decisions, nations may be 
unwilling to implement national or regional regulations that effectuate 
U.N.S.C. resolutions concerning sanctions. This unwillingness alone 
could result in a major gap in the coverage of the 1267 regime, particu-
larly in light of the asset-freezing and travel-banning requirements of the 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Rapport de la Commission de Politique Extérieure du Parlement Suisse 
(Report of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Swiss Parliament), Les Fonde-
ments de Notre Ordre Juridique Court-circuités par l’ONU (The Foundations of 
Our Judicial Order Short-circuited by the United Nations) (2010), http://www. 
parlament.ch/afs/data/f/bericht/2009/f_bericht_n_k4_0_20093719_0_20100301.htm. 
141 Fassbender, supra note 37, at 6–7 (“[A] trend can be perceived widening the scope 
of customary law in regard to due process to include direct ‘governmental’ action of in-
ternational organizations vis-à-vis individuals.”). Fassbender notes that a contributing fac-
tor to this trend has been the law of the European Community. Id. 
142 See id. ¶ 6. 
143 See Búrca, supra note 53, at 42. 
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Resolutions. Those concerned that their names could appear on the 
blacklist could move their assets (or perhaps even their persons) to non-
complying nations. When that group of nations is the European Com-
munity, known for its usual respect for and deference to international 
law, such a hole in member-state implementation could threaten to un-
seat the whole regime.144 As noted by scholars, targeted sanctions are 
only as strong as the weakest link of member state implementation.145 
 Clearly, the European Community’s refusal to participate fully in 
the regime based on the inviolability of the guarantees stemming from 
the EC Treaty would be inconsistent with the U.N. Charter’s supposed 
primacy over other international treaties.146 Furthermore, “[j]udicial 
review of Security Council resolutions by national courts would open a 
Pandora’s box and result in the fragmentation of U.N. resolutions 
along the borders of national and supranational jurisdictions.”147 Ulti-
mately, judicial review could undermine the credibility of the Security 
Council. Court decisions to prioritize the protection of due process 
over security concerns arguably weaken not only the resolutions at 
hand, but also the U.N.S.C.’s overall ability to create an effective and 
unified regime.148 
 Thus, in addition to extensive legal and philosophical arguments 
that the U.N.S.C. should be responsive to due process concerns,149 secu-
rity concerns provoked by judicial resistance compel the Security Coun-
cil to reform.150 Considering that over fifty member states have ex-
pressed concern over the efficacy of the 1267 regime, this pressure is 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Búrca, supra note 53, at 3 (noting the Kadi decision “sits uncomfortably . . . with 
the broader political ambition of the EU to carve out a distinctive international role for itself 
as a ‘normative power’ committed to effective multilateralism under international law”). 
145 The Stockholm Process, Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines 
for the Implementation of the UN Policy Options 10 (Peter Wallensteen et al. eds., 
2003). 
146 Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 7 (noting that an 
annulment of the national measures implementing a U.N.S.C. resolution “could also chal-
lenge Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that obligations under the Charter shall 
prevail over obligations Member States may have under any other international agree-
ment”). 
147 Reich, supra note 19, at 510. 
148 See Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 7 (“In the final 
analysis, should a regional or national court judgment challenge the application of na-
tional measures giving effect to a listing by a Security Council sanctions committee, the 
decision could undermine the effective implementation of UN sanctions.”). 
149 See Fassbender, supra note 37, at 7. 
150 See Reich, supra note 19, at 509 (“The looming possibility of a clash between na-
tional courts and the international regime should encourage the member states to press 
for an overhaul of the current sanctions regime.”). 
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not inconsiderable, and the worry that other states could follow Canada 
and Europe’s suit is well-founded.151 Even the Special Rapporteur on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights for the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe expressed his hope that “national courts could actu-
ally compel the UN authorities to improve their procedures and so help 
to increase the legitimacy of these lists . . . .”152 Given both human rights 
and security concerns, a critical moment to press for reform has arrived. 
B. Suggestions for Reform 
 Over the past decade, many suggestions for reform of the 1267 
regime have been proposed and discussed. Resolutions subsequent to 
Resolution 1267 have incorporated some of these suggestions into the 
regime by later resolutions.153 The current procedure, however, still 
leaves much to be desired in terms of accountability, individual access, 
impartiality, and effective remedy.154 In particular, commentators have 
noted that there is still no protection against arbitrary decision-making 
by the Sanctions Committee, and no way to review allegations once a 
listing is imposed.155 Other criticisms focus on the lack of transparency 
in the decisions to list or delist.156 Yet another problem is the uncertain 
                                                                                                                      
151 See U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning 
Al-Qaida & the Taliban & Associated Individuals & Entities, Analytical Support & Sanctions 
Monitoring Team, Fourth Report Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individu-
als and Entities, ¶¶ 40–46, U.N. Doc. S/2006/154 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www. 
un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267mg.htm. 
152 Eur. Parl. Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, UN Security Council and Euro-
pean Union Blacklists, ¶ 5, Doc. No. 11454, add. (2007). 
153 See supra notes 22–23, 25–36 and accompanying text. 
154 See Fassbender, supra note 37, at 4 (“Whether the respective committee, or the Se-
curity Council itself, grants a de-listing request is entirely within the committee’s or the 
Council’s discretion; no legal rules exist that would oblige the committee or the Council to 
grant a request if specific conditions are met.”); see also Biersteker & Eckert, Watson 
Report Update, supra note 55, at 5 ("It is important to recognize the important changes 
already made and to give credit to the serious and painstaking efforts to address the prob-
lems. Nonetheless, legal challenges in national and regional courts, concerns in parlia-
mentary assemblies, and criticism from the human rights committee continue.”). 
155 Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down 
the Deliberative Deficit, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 275, 297 (2008) (“A report issued by the Council 
of Europe in 2006 stated that the 1267 process violates the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights because it provides no protection against arbitrary decisions and no mecha-
nism for reviewing the accuracy of allegations made.”). 
156 See id. at 298 (“The third line of criticism relates to the lack of reasons given for de-
cisions at each step.”); see also Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, 
at 3 (“Finally, the lack of transparency of committee procedures and difficulties in obtain-
ing information contribute to general perceptions of unfairness.”). To the Security Coun-
cil’s credit, Resolutions 1735 and 1822 did attempt to respond to many of the transparency 
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and potentially unlimited timeline for delisting decisions,157 as “in prac-
tice, such requests can carry on indefinitely [and] [s]tates may either 
object without specifying a reason or demand a technical hold that 
places the request on indefinite hold.”158 Ultimately, despite the steps 
that have been made towards opening up the Sanctions Committee to 
individual petitions, the underlying issue is that delisting decisions re-
main a political process.159 Targets still do not have the opportunity to 
present their cases in front of the Sanctions Committee, and, should 
they lack support from their states of residence or citizenship, it is un-
likely that their requests will be taken seriously.160 In addition, “[g]iven 
that the same body is responsible for initial placement on the list and 
the subsequent review of those decisions, it seems that the opportunity 
for review is neither full nor impartial.”161 From a target’s standpoint, 
political decision-making is an insufficient guarantee of fair considera-
tion and effective remedy.162 
 To improve these lapses in due process, commentators have ar-
gued over the past decade for various remedial mechanisms.163 The 
                                                                                                                      
criticisms by asking member states to provide more information when listing and by re-
quiring the Sanctions Committee to make more information available on its website. Cur-
rently, however, states or members of the Sanctions Committee blocking a request for de-
listing are not required to explain why. See U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant 
to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-Qaida & the Taliban & Associated Individuals & Enti-
ties, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, ¶¶ 4–6 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf. 
157 Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 37. 
158 Id. The recently enacted Resolution 1904 does require the Ombudsperson to en-
sure stricter timelines for consideration and responses to delisting requests. See S.C. Res. 
1904, supra note 3, annex 2. Given the purely nonbinding nature of the Ombudsperson’s 
recommendations, however, it remains to be seen if this new framework will result in time-
ly decisions. 
159 This is not to say that permitting individuals to bypass state espousal and take re-
quests directly to the Focal Point and now the ombudsperson was not a huge procedural 
improvement. Indeed, before Resolutions 1735 and 1904 it was possible that the largest 
hidden problem was that individual requests never made it to the Sanctions Committee 
due to a state’s unwillingness to espouse the claim. Id. at 34–36. 
160 See id. 
161 Peter Gutherie, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 491, 514 (2004). 
162 See Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 72 Nordic J. Int’l L. 159, 183 (2003) (“As regards the question of politi-
cal safeguards, these are obviously insufficient from the individual perspective.”). 
163 See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5599th mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5599 (Dec. 19, 
2006); Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 47; Fassbender, 
supra note 37, at 30–31; Cameron, supra note 162, at 208–11; Gutherie, supra note 161, at 
524–41; Reich, supra note 19, at 510; Press Release, Press Conference by Special Rappor-
teur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http:// 
www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/081022_Scheinin.doc.htm. A wide range of meas-
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most aggressive suggestion has been to entirely dismantle the 1267 re-
gime and leave blacklisting decisions fully in the hands of member 
states.164 Under this proposal, “[s]tates would be responsible for both 
determining who should be sanctioned and for providing the proce-
dural protections that accompany sanctioning.”165 Consequently, “[t]he 
coordination role of the Security Council would be replaced by the bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements concerning sanctioning.”166 States 
would cooperate with each other, either through formal treaties or in-
formal case-by-case agreements to ensure that sanctioned individuals 
had their assets and movements restricted world-wide.167 
 A similar and more radical proposal that has surfaced but has not 
been favored by the U.N.’s own Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and Countering Terrorism has been the abolition of the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee coupled with the movement of listing to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee’s jurisdiction on the basis of Resolution 1373.168 
This alternative would eliminate the entire question of due process by 
having the U.N. provide expertise for judicial decisions made on a na-
tional level, but without a U.N.-sponsored list.169 Another upside to this 
alternative could be the increase in state participation in reporting. 
States have reported much more frequently to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, despite the fact that they are under no obligation to do so, 
than to the Sanctions Committee, where U.N.S.C.-dictated obligation 
does exist.170 
 Apart from decentralizing alternatives, another suggestion has 
been to allow listing at the U.N. level but to promote state judicial review 
of such decisions.171 This is essentially the default that has emerged from 
                                                                                                                      
ures has also been suggested for improving listing procedures as an aspect of due process. 
Nevertheless, as the recent court cases have focused on the right of effective remedy as the 
crucial aspect of due process, this Article duly focuses only on suggestions for delisting. 
164 See Gutherie, supra note 161, at 525–26. 
165 Id. at 525. 
166 Id. 
167 See id. at 526. 
168 Press Release, supra note 163. 
169 In Segi, for example, the ECJ found the fact that the listing decisions were made on 
the national level meant that the petitioner could avail himself of the national due process 
protection. See Segi v. Council, ¶¶ 59–62, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 
2015 (Feb. 27, 2007); see discussion supra Part I. 
170 See Eric Rosand, Current Developments: The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Im-
plementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 745, 758–59 (2004) (discussing 
the strange discrepancy between state reporting to the CTC Committee and the 1267 
Sanctions Committee). 
171 See Gutherie, supra note 161, at 535 (“Another possibility is for the Security Council 
to legitimate the role of state mechanisms for review of 1267 Committee decisions.”). 
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the ECJ’s Kadi II decision.172 If institutionalized, “the Security Council 
would explicitly recognize the capacity of state and regional bodies to 
play a critical role in reviewing sanctioning determinations.”173 On the 
one hand, this model would allow the U.N.S.C. to retain oversight, while 
ensuring that individual nations would be able to uphold their stan-
dards of due process protection.174 On the other hand, this approach 
could also create massive gaps in the sanctions regime, as different states 
could adopt different approaches to reviews. Even if the U.N.S.C. were 
to set standards for review, it would be “impossible to set them in a 
manner that is acceptable to all member states.”175 
 Some commentators, including members of the Security Coun-
cil176 and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering 
Terrorism,177 have pressed for more centralized alternatives, such as the 
establishment of an independent tribunal within the U.N. with the 
power to review individual petitions and issue binding delisting deci-
sions on the Sanctions Committee.178 Each of the commentators who 
have suggested this mechanism has a slightly different take on the 
structure of such a tribunal. Some recommend an arbitral panel;179 
some recommend an appeals court for the Sanction Committee’s deci-
sions;180 and still others call for the Secretary General to compose a 
                                                                                                                      
172 See Kadi II, ¶ 225, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954. 
173 Gutherie, supra note 161, at 535. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. at 536. 
176 U.N. SCOR, supra note 163, at 2–3 (including a statement by Denmark advocating 
for the establishment of “an independent review mechanism”). 
177 See Press Release, supra note 163. 
178 See, e.g., Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 47 (espous-
ing the creation of an independent arbitral panel to consider delisting proposals); Fass-
bender, supra note 37, at 30–31 (“Among the options available to the Council are the es-
tablishment of—an independent international court or tribunal . . . .”); Cameron, supra 
note 162, at 208–11 (analyzing the benefits and disadvantages of an international arbitral 
body with the competence to hear delisting requests); Gutherie, supra note 161, at 532 
(“Thus, if internal procedures are to be relied upon to satisfy the rights of targeted indi-
viduals, the Security Council will need to establish an independent review body.”); Reich, 
supra note 19, at 510 (“Hence, the U.N. itself must provide for an independent administra-
tive mechanism to review both the listing and de-listing decisions made by the Commit-
tee.”). 
179 See Cameron, supra note 162, at 209–10 (discussing how such a panel would be 
composed). 
180 See Gutherie, supra note 161, at 532 (“Here the tribunal would be created to hear 
appeals of decisions taken by the 1267 Committee, and potentially other administrative 
bodies that have been created under auspices of Chapter VII action by the Security Coun-
cil.”). 
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panel of experts.181 Nevertheless, there are a few common factors on 
which most commentators agree. An individual must be able to bring 
his request directly to the tribunal, which would have full access to non-
redacted information, including the sensitive security information 
about the individual’s case. Although the arbitrators/judges might be 
picked by the U.N.S.C., they would, in effect, form an independent ju-
dicial mechanism similar to judges presiding over the international 
criminal tribunals. Finally, nearly all proponents of this kind of mecha-
nism agree that the tribunal would have the power to issue binding de-
cisions on an individual’s delisting. 
 Another popular suggestion is the creation of an independent 
ombudsperson office within the U.N., which would have the power to 
consider individual delisting requests and issue non-binding recom-
mendations.182 This proposal also varies slightly depending on the 
commentator, but most agree that the ombudsperson should be en-
dowed with broad powers to investigate a delisting request—although 
the office may not possess full access to sensitive intelligence informa-
tion. The ombudsperson would also be accessible to individual delisting 
requests, despite the fact that he or she would not give an individual 
the opportunity to present his or her case at a formal hearing. The 
ombudsperson’s ultimate decision on an individual’s case would carry 
substantial weight but would not bind the Sanctions Committee.183 This 
proposal, essentially, is the one that has gained the most currency with 
the U.N.S.C. and was recently established by Resolution 1904.184 Nota-
bly, Resolution 1904 did not establish a permanent ombudsperson’s 
office but rather a temporary one with an eighteen-month mandate.185 
                                                                                                                      
181 See Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 46–47 (“[A] list of 
arbitrators and experts with appropriate experience (criminal or administrative law, secu-
rity, human rights) would be composed by the Secretary-General and called upon to form 
ad hoc three-member panels to hear individual delisting appeals.”). 
182 See id. at 45 (“The ombudsperson would be independently appointed and make in-
dependent recommendations about delisting requests.”); Fassbender, supra note 37, at 
30–31 (noting that “an ombudsperson office, as it exists in a number of States and in the 
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183 Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 45 (“[T]he ombuds-
person’s decision would not be binding on the sanctions committee. Procedurally, the 
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184 See S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 3, annex 2. 
185 Id. 
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 The least aggressive suggestion is to simply maintain the status quo 
but to encourage the Security Council to word its future resolutions 
broadly enough that states would be afforded the discretion to imple-
ment them in accordance with domestic human rights standards.186 As 
an illustration, in adopting a Chapter VII resolution to reform the Con-
solidated Listing, the Security Council could require that member 
states must implement resolutions in a manner consistent with ICCPR 
obligations, regardless of whether the state in question is a party to that 
treaty. Such maintenance of the status quo may “retain the questions of 
the Security Council’s legitimacy in mandating sanctions without suffi-
cient procedural protections and domestic courts’ authority in review-
ing implementation of those sanctions.”187 Granted, one might counter 
that maintaining the status quo until the present has not led to “nu-
anced political compromise” but rather to the beginnings of what 
might become a major breach in the 1267 security regime. Even more 
broadly-worded U.N.S.C. resolutions would also probably water-down 
their effectiveness and uniform implementation. 
III. Analysis: A Framework for Consideration 
 There is no lack of suggested due process-improving mechanisms 
from which to choose.188 Therefore, in determining which of the many 
suggestions would provide the most effective reform, it is crucial to iso-
late criteria by which to judge whether a particular method has ad-
dressed the key concerns critics have raised.189 Many legal commenta-
tors who have considered this issue have viewed the due process 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Erika de Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary Role 
of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review, 9 German L.J. 1987, 2001 (2008) 
(discussing how the ECJ was able to avoid review of Security Council measures because the 
resolution at hand was “formulated in broad terms, as a result of which those responsible 
for their implementation had discretion as to how to achieve the desired result”); Guthe-
rie, supra note 161, at 521–22 (noting that leaving the development of the system to the 
Security Council, the relevant Security Council committees, and state and regional politi-
cal and judicial branches will encourage political compromise that takes into account con-
cerns of security and due process). 
187 Gutherie, supra note 161, at 521–22 (quoting Jared Wessel, Safety in Ambiguity, 
Danger in Positivism: A Case for Leaving the Executive-Legislative Relationship Undefined 
in an Emergency Powers Regime 3–4 ( June 4, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
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188 See Fassbender, supra note 37, 30–31. 
189 See id. at 4. 
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inadequacy strictly as a human rights problem.190 Although there are 
due process concerns, there is also a critical security risk at stake, as a 
state’s or group of states’ refusal to enforce targeted sanctions could 
undermine the entire regime.191 The goal is for improvements in due 
process to bolster the counter-terrorism regime and maximize compli-
ance with U.N.S.C. resolutions.192 In sum, there are three critical issues 
which must be considered: (1) improving due process for delisting re-
quests; (2) ensuring the effectiveness of the 1267 counter-terrorism re-
gime; and (3) maintaining the authority of the U.N.S.C. In seeking a 
mechanism that supports these three prongs, it is important to analyze 
the key factors bolstering each area. 
A. Improving Due Process 
 Effective due process relies on three principal concerns: the inde-
pendence of the decision-maker, the accessibility of the decision-maker 
to the individual, and the power of the decision-maker to grant an ef-
fective remedy.193 With regard to the first factor, long-standing national 
and international norms have dictated that impartiality is a crucial 
component of fair adjudication.194 Accordingly, proposed mechanisms 
that lack an independent decision-maker will not pass due process mus-
ter. For example, any panel of experts or judicial body that is entirely 
                                                                                                                      
190 See E.J. Flynn, The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights, 7 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 371, 374–76 (2007) (discussing Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Executive Director of 
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193 See Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 3 (“Elements that 
render an effective remedy are: (i) an independent and impartial authority, (ii) decision-
making authority, and (iii) accessibility.”). 
194 See ICCPR, supra note 52, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 (“In the determination of any crimi-
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entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”); Fassbender, supra note 37, at 6 (“[Due process] rights can be con-
sidered as part of the corpus of customary international law, and are also protected by 
general principles of law in the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1, lit. c, of the ICJ stat-
ute.”). 
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chosen by, dependent on, or easily replaced by the Security Council 
probably would not pass the bar of providing effective due process.195 
 Given the nature of targeted sanctions, accessibility to the target 
remains the most glaring due process feature absent from the 1267 re-
gime. After all, the Security Council was not designed for specific com-
plaints or input, although it has slipped into making these kinds of de-
cisions that affect targets.196 Commentators have argued that to restrain 
the growing unaccountability of international organizations over indi-
viduals and groups, it is important to shift accountability relationships 
beyond those solely accessible to states.197 Targets must be allowed to 
directly challenge the decisions that affect their rights.198 Hence, com-
mentators have consistently called for this kind of accessibility, as it is 
the key to due process reform.199 
 Some reform suggestions do not lend themselves well to target ac-
cess. For instance, simply relying on the Security Council to word its 
decisions more broadly in the future does not open the process at all to 
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Cohesion, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 881, 887 (2006) (“No one could have reasonably anticipated at 
the time of the drafting of the UN Charter that the subsequent practice of the organ 
would evolve to encompass a general law-making—and previously quasi-judicial—activity to 
face threats to the international legal order . . . .”). 
197 See de Wet, supra note 186, at 1987. The author notes: 
The growing power of international institutions in areas that were formerly 
regulated domestically, along with the growing impact of their conduct on 
(the rights of) States and non-State actors alike, has thus far not been 
matched by a shift in accountability relationships beyond those applicable 
within the confines of the territorial State. 
Id. 
198 See Andrew Byrnes, An Effective Complaints Procedure in the Context of International 
Human Rights Law, in The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century 139, 
144 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000) (“One measure of the effectiveness of an international 
complaints procedure that might be adopted is whether the procedure is really accessible 
to the citizens of the countries which have accepted it . . . .”). 
199 U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5474th mtg. at 7–8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5474 ( June 22, 2006); 
see also Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 44 (noting that “pro-
cedural guarantees such as accessibility for individuals or entities affected” constitute a 
traditional element of the right to an effective remedy); Fassbender, supra note 37, at 6 
(“Generally recognized due process rights include the right of every person to be heard 
before an individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken . . . .”). 
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targets. Less obvious perhaps is that an ombudsperson’s office, al-
though open to target delisting requests, does not allow for participa-
tion in the process because targets are not allowed to present their own 
case; rather, they must simply wait for termination of the investigation 
and issuance of a recommendation. If due process is to be taken seri-
ously, targets must be afforded as full an opportunity as possible to de-
fend their rights. 
 The third factor underlying due process is the decision-maker’s 
ability to guarantee an effective remedy, which entails several other spe-
cific considerations. The decision must be made in a timely manner to 
ensure that the petitioner is not left in legal limbo.200 The decision must 
be well-reasoned and persuasive.201 Most importantly in the context of 
delisting, the reviewing body must have the power to issue binding deci-
sions, as a mere recommendation to the Sanctions Committee cannot 
guarantee the petitioner’s rights will be safeguarded.202 The importance 
of binding decisions casts a negative light on several of the reform sug-
gestions. Neither the proposed panel of investigatory experts nor the 
ombudsperson’s office is granted anything more than recommendatory 
powers by their putative creators. From the vantage-point of maximizing 
due process, some of the more centralized recommendations—such as 
an ombudsperson’s office, a panel of investigatory experts, or persuad-
ing the U.N.S.C. to use broader language—are less desirable. 
B. Ensuring the Effectiveness of the 1267 Counter-terrorism Regime 
 Due process concerns instigated the current security crisis by pro-
voking courts to annul regulations that implement the Security Coun-
                                                                                                                      
200 See Fassbender, supra note 37, at 31. (listing “speed and efficiency of consideration 
by the reviewing body” as a criterion for effectiveness of a remedy); Byrnes, supra note 198, 
at 146 (“From the individual complainant’s point of view, a speedy determination of a 
complaint is obviously desirable.”). 
201 See Fassbender, supra note 37, at 31 (noting that the quality of the decision-making 
is an important factor); Byrnes, supra note 198, at 149 (indicating that the ability to ex-
plain and justify an adjudicatory decision “is important for the acceptance and implemen-
tation of the decision by the party affected in an individual case, as well as for establishing 
the legitimacy of the body more generally”). 
202 Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that deci-
sion-making authority is an important element of an effective remedy); Fassbender, supra 
note 37, at 31 (listing compliance and follow-up as important considerations of an individ-
ual complaint mechanism); Byrnes, supra note 198, at 151 (“The speedy and effective im-
plementation of a decision of an adjudicatory body is a critical indicator of the effective-
ness of a complaint procedure.”); Cameron, supra note 162, at 210 (“To fully satisfy the 
human rights objections, the decision of the arbitral body would have to be binding on the 
sanctions committee.”). 
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cil’s counter-terrorism resolutions. Accordingly, any mechanism that 
would remedy due process concerns must not lose sight of the impor-
tant goal of securing effective implementation of the 1267 regime. An 
effective counter-terrorism regime requires several key elements. For 
instance, states and the international community must be able to move 
with speed when reacting to a potential terrorist threat. Therefore, 
most of the proposed reforms focus on post-hoc mechanisms. Although 
due process normally requires that an opportunity be given to an indi-
vidual to challenge his or her listing before it occurs, the necessity of 
speed in preventing a putative terrorist-supporter from funneling fi-
nances into terrorist hands explains only permitting challenges after 
listings have occurred.203 
 Perhaps the thorniest issue in improving counter-terrorist efforts is 
that of restricting access to sensitive information. As states are keen on 
keeping intelligence private, they are often reluctant to share their 
sources and methods with other states, or even the U.N., to preserve the 
secrecy of their intelligence-gathering capabilities.204 This lack of coop-
eration in the intelligence realm renders less appealing any reform sug-
gestion by which national courts review the listing, unless the designat-
ing state also happens to be the reviewing state (and the government 
feels comfortable giving sensitive information to the national judiciary). 
It is unlikely states trust each other enough to give a foreign judiciary 
the necessary security information to make an informed decision on an 
individual’s case.205 Consequently, reviewing courts may end up making 
uninformed delisting decisions, and such decisions are likely to be 
skewed in favor of unfreezing dangerous individuals’ assets because the 
information justifying the freeze will not be readily accessible. This con-
sideration also implicates advisory mechanisms at the level of the U.N., 
such as an ombudsperson’s office or group of experts, given that desig-
nating states may not feel comfortable sharing information with an in-
ternational judicial body.206 The more independent, and thus free from 
                                                                                                                      
203 See Gutherie, supra note 161, at 530–31 (noting that the problem of needing “to act 
quickly to prevent asset transfers to terrorists . . . is one that can be solved through post-
hoc review”). 
204 See id. at 537 (“[T]he state(s) recommending listing to the 1267 Committee may 
not be willing to share detailed information with the government of other states that are 
implementing the sanctions.”). 
205 See id. 
206 See Cameron, supra note 162, at 209 (“There are special problems involved in giving 
international judicial bodies access to very sensitive intelligence material. There is a real 
risk of leakage of intelligence to hostile states, which may well be members of the Security 
Council.”); Johnstone, supra note 155, at 307 (“If an ombudsperson were established, con-
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the control of a potentially hostile state, such a mechanism is, and the 
more highly-trained in handling intelligence material the experts cho-
sen to adjudicate are, the less pressing the information leakage issue 
becomes. 
 The final counter-terrorism concern is the need for broad and 
uniform coverage of the 1267 regime. Allowing individual states using 
different standards to review listing decisions could lead to wide-spread 
unevenness in the implementation of the regime. The most problem-
atic scenario would be that in which the courts of a state less sympa-
thetic to counter-terrorism concerns would allow lax implementation 
and freely delist those individuals who represent a legitimate threat to 
international security. For this reason, the suggestions to allow state ju-
dicial review of a Sanctions Committee listing, or to totally abolish the 
Sanctions Committee in favor of moving the question of listing to the 
jurisdiction of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (again, allowing state 
judicial review), do not adequately address real security concerns. 
 In general, the counter-terrorism requirements of speed of im-
plementation, security of sensitive intelligence, and broad and uniform 
coverage point away from decentralized measures that would allow for 
state listing decisions or state judicial review of Sanction Committee 
listing decisions. 
C. Reaffirming the Authority of the U.N.S.C. 
 Ultimately, the resolution of such due process and security con-
cerns should reaffirm the U.N.S.C.’s importance in a world in which 
threats to peace and security persist.207 The U.N.S.C. was not originally 
designed to impact targets directly,208 and its mechanisms are not di-
rectly well-suited to discharging a judicial function.209 In assuming such 
governmental functions, the U.N.S.C. has opened itself up to criticism 
by the judicial keepers of constitutional guarantees. On behalf of these 
guarantees and the individuals protected by them, the recent decisions 
issued by regional and domestic courts have challenged the primacy of 
the U.N.S.C. over international law. Above and beyond all, in order to 
be palatable to members of the Security Council, any reform mecha-
                                                                                                                      
fidentiality issues would surely arise, as states would be reluctant to provide such an office 
with sensitive information.”). 
207 See Biersteker & Eckert, Targeted Sanctions, supra note 9, at 7. 
208 See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
209 See Cameron, supra note 162, at 168 (noting that the Security Council is assuming a 
judicial and legislative role in targeting individuals); Johnstone, supra note 155, at 300 
(arguing that the Security Council is ill-suited to assuming a quasi-judicial role). 
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nism must support the U.N.S.C.’s place as the absolute keeper of inter-
national peace and security. 
 Any measure which infringes too greatly on the U.N.S.C.’s author-
ity will not reaffirm the relevance of the U.N.S.C. in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It is far more likely that U.N.S.C. 
member states would be willing to entertain suggestions that recentral-
ize reviewing authority within the U.N.S.C. than one handing over such 
review to member states. Certainly, the U.N.S.C. would not consent to 
dismantling its own regime to increase state sanctioning control nor to 
authorize states to review delisting requests that implicitly review the 
Chapter VII resolutions that created them.210 Any decentralization of 
the counter-terrorist regime would serve only to weaken perceptions of 
the Security Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness.211 
 To allow review without undermining the U.N.S.C.’s primacy, any 
measure selected must focus solely on review of the application of the 
targeted resolution to an individual’s case and not on the validity of the 
resolution itself. The right to an effective remedy extends only so far as 
the target’s rights are infringed, or, “[i]n other words, an individual per-
son cannot contend that a resolution adopted by the Council as such is 
unlawful under the UN Charter.” 212 In addition, the review mechanism 
should not be accessible to member states attempting to claim the same 
unlawfulness or to a person affected by general sanctions.213 Any me-
chanism established must be strictly limited to targets seeking no more 
than their personal delisting. 
 Finally, reform measures must be politically and practically viable 
vis-à-vis members of the U.N.S.C. As noted above, any mechanism 
which is perceived to infringe on U.N.S.C. authority is unlikely to gar-
ner the needed support.214 By contrast, implementing the most defer-
ential suggestion (that the U.N.S.C. merely be encouraged to more 
broadly word their resolutions to allow for state discretion) also strips 
the U.N.S.C. of its ability to ensure specific and effective enforcement 
of its regime.215 Moreover, we must consider issues of expense and 
                                                                                                                      
210 See Gutherie, supra note 161, at 493. 
211 See id. (arguing that dismantling the Security Council regime is unfeasible “because 
decentralization of sanctions would entail a loss of legitimacy and effectiveness and would 
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212 See Fassbender, supra note 37, at 29. 
213 See Cameron, supra note 162, at 184 (“But even if some form of external review 
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complexity; although composed of some of the world’s most powerful 
and wealthy nations, the U.N.S.C. might also be loath to pursue any 
reform perceived as too costly or too bureaucratic, such as instituting 
an entirely separate reviewing body within the U.N.216 In short, in seek-
ing to reaffirm the authority of the U.N.S.C., it is crucial to pursue a 
centralized measure open only to individual and group petitioners. 
Such a measure must not be too costly or complex to create. 
D. Selecting the Right Reform Measure 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
II.  Ensuring effective of counter-
terrorism regime
• Speed in potential delisting
• Access to and protecting sensitive 
information
• Broad and uniform coverage
I.  Improving due process
• Independence of decision-maker
• Accessibility
• Power to grant remedy
III.  Reaffirming authority of UN 
Security Council
• Review focused on application of           
resolution to case
• Practically viable
• Politically viable
Independent 
Tribunal
Dismantle 
1267; move 
to state control
Ombudsperson’s 
office
High
Low
Best option
 
 These multiple due process, counter-terrorism, and U.N.S.C. pri-
macy tugs on the reins of reform demonstrate that there is no one clear 
direction. Rather, the best measure will be the one that most effectively 
balances these competing concerns. An independent tribunal com-
posed of security-savvy judges and selected by the U.N.S.C., which has 
the power to hear target complaints and issue binding delisting deci-
sions on the Sanctions Committee, constitutes the mechanism best-
suited to the task. 
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 Such a judicial mechanism is not unprecedented. The U.N.S.C.’s 
establishment of the Independent Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and subsequent tribunals such as the Independent 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),217 has proven its ability to create 
an independent body with the competence to hear and adjudicate in-
dividuals’ cases. A 1267 tribunal could serve in a similar capacity. The 
U.N.S.C. would initially select a number of judges with the relevant ju-
dicial and security expertise. This permanent body would be author-
ized to hear target complaints resulting not only from delisting requests 
based on the current Consolidated List but also from complaints result-
ing from due process violations for any other U.N.S.C. resolutions that 
target individuals and groups. Given the outcry over the humanitarian 
toll exactly by general sanctions, it is likely that the U.N.S.C. will con-
tinue to expand its use of targeted sanctions.218 Targets would be 
granted a hearing, and this body would have access to all relevant in-
formation about the listing. 
 Such a tribunal would effectively satisfy the current due process 
complaints. To be sure, the judges would be initially selected by the 
U.N.S.C. and thus arguably predisposed to certain biases. Much like the 
ICTY and the ICTR, however, the intent is that the extended terms of a 
judge’s position after appointment would help ensure judicial inde-
pendence, as much as that ideal is attainable. The U.N.S.C. could fur-
ther bolster the independence of tribunal judges by requiring the elec-
tion of judges through procedures similar to those of the International 
Court of Justice and other special tribunals for seating judges.219 Cru-
cially, such a tribunal would also be fully open for individuals and 
groups to both make delisting requests and present their cases. The 
tribunal would also have the power to issue delisting decisions binding 
                                                                                                                      
217 For example, these include the Independent Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda estab-
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on the Sanctions Committee, thereby ensuring the worthy petitioner an 
effective remedy.220 
 Ideally, the tribunal would repair the patchy implementation of 
the 1267 regime. After all, the ECJ in Kadi II explicitly stated that were a 
review mechanism provided through the U.N.S.C., it would not have 
intervened.221 Not only would the tribunal help bring the European 
Community states back into compliance, but it would also do so without 
compromising any of the other goals of the 1267 regime. The fact that 
the tribunal would be open only for post-hoc review of listing ensures 
that the Sanctions Committee and member states could still act with 
speed in listing a putative-terrorist supporter. To assuage concern over 
disclosure of sensitive information, the U.N.S.C. could choose judges 
who are both experienced in handling intelligence and trusted by a 
large group of nations—indeed, one imagines such skills would be 
mandatory for a judge to win the support of enough U.N.S.C. members 
to be appointed. 
 Giving the judges access to all case materials does not necessarily 
mean petitioners would also be granted full access to view the same se-
curity information, although the rules of this new tribunal should en-
courage maximum disclosure and allow particular lawyers to be pro-
vided security clearances to view certain information, even if that access 
is denied to the listed parties themselves. This may put petitioners at a 
disadvantage in their inability to present their cases. Such a compro-
mise is necessary, however, given the importance of security concerns to 
member states who propose listings. It is important to remember that 
despite the importance of due process and the possible harshness of 
the asset freeze and travel ban, these resolutions do not expose those 
listed to criminal sanctions, but rather to administrative sanctions.222 
                                                                                                                      
220 The existence of such a tribunal would not deprive the Sanctions Committee of its 
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The judges could mitigate some of the unfairness by revealing the intel-
ligence they deem safe to expose and by discarding or assigning less 
weight to those parts of the case that the petitioner does not have an 
opportunity to rebut.223 
 Finally, concentrating review power under the auspices of the Se-
curity Council reaffirms the authority and relevance of the Council in 
matters of international peace and security.224 The tribunal would only 
have jurisdiction to hear individual and group delisting requests. This 
limitation would stymie any potential challenge to the underlying reso-
lution from discontented state petitioners.225 Moreover, the placement 
of the tribunal within the U.N. also eliminates any incidental review of 
U.N.S.C. resolutions stemming from regional court consideration of an 
targets’s complaints (as when the CFI held that U.N.S.C. resolutions 
could be bounded by jus cogens). Concededly, such a tribunal will likely 
be expensive and, at the outset, difficult to implement. But if the tribu-
nal is made permanent, it is likely to become more cost-efficient in the 
long run, particularly as the U.N.S.C.’s use of targeted sanctions is only 
bound to increase.226 Thus, while all potential solutions are imperfect, 
the establishment of an independent tribunal is the best option to bal-
ance competing concerns. 
Conclusion 
 For the past several years, critics of Resolution 1267’s lack of due 
process have been asking the U.N.S.C. to reform the regime to allow 
targets to challenge their listing. What makes the present a particularly 
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germane time to urge reform is that recent domestic and regional 
court decisions have begun turning the due process issue into a security 
concern. As had become clear from the adoption of Resolution 1904 
and the establishment of a temporary ombudsperson’s office, U.N.S.C. 
members finally have a real incentive to consider the human-rights 
problem that confronts them. In addition, the temporary nature of the 
ombudsperson’s office, combined with the fact that its establishment 
has not persuaded courts that the due process problems have been 
fixed, has effectively given the U.N.S.C. an eighteen-month time-limit 
to decide how to permanently solve this problem.227 The choice is clear 
for the U.N.S.C.: ignore mounting judicial concerns over due process 
violations and potentially face an increasing number of states refusing 
to implement resolutions; or, incorporate due process protection into 
the 1267 regime and regain its footing as the leading international en-
tity responsible for maintaining international peace and security. 
 Although it may be obvious that the time for reform is at hand, the 
form of the measures that should be instituted is much less clear. There 
is no single ideal solution but rather a set of criteria which, when con-
sidered together, help identify the need for an independent, speedy, 
inexpensive, post-hoc, intelligence-guarding judicial tribunal that is 
only accessible to the targets and capable of promising an effective 
remedy. As a result, both human rights and security critics should en-
courage the Security Council to satisfy due process, counter-terrorism, 
and U.N.S.C. authority-concerns by initiating a process to bring this 
promising new tribunal to fruition. 
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